Empirical evidence suggests that there is a long lag between the time a new technology is introduced and the time at which it is widely adopted. The conventional wisdom is that these observations are inconsistent with the predictions of the frictionless neoclassical model.
calculation more complicated, but they still leave it in the realm of the neoclassical model. A simple minded application of the theory of the Þrm suggests that proÞtable innovations should be adopted instantaneously, or with some delay depending on various forms of cost of adjustment.
The evidence on adoption of new technologies seems to contradict this prediction. One of the 'stylized facts' in this literature is that the adoption rate is S-shaped and that it takes a long time until a large fraction of units adopts the new technology. Several studies -e.g. Griliches (1957) , Gort and Klepper (1982) and Jovanovic and Lach (1997) , among others -have documented the logistic shape of the diffusion curve. Jovanovic and Lach (1997) report that, for a group of 21 innovations, it takes 15 years for its diffusion to go from 10% to 90%, the 10-90 lag. They also cite the results of a study by Grübler (1991) covering 265 innovations who Þnds that, for most diffusion processes, the 10-90 lag is between 15 and 30 years. 1 In response to this apparent failure of the simple neoclassical model, a large number of papers have introduced 'frictions' to account for the 'slow' adoption rate. These frictions include, among others, learning-by-doing (e.g. Jovanovic and Lach (1989) , Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) , Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Felli and Ortalo-Magné (1997), and Atkeson and Kehoe (2001)), vintage human capital (e.g. Chari and Hopenhayn (1994) and Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) ), informational barriers and spillovers across Þrms (e.g. Jovanovic and Macdonald (1994) ), resistance on the part of sectoral interests (e.g. Parente and Prescott (1994) ), coordination problems (e.g. Shleifer (1986) ) and search-type frictions (e.g. Manuelli (2002) ).
In this paper we take, in some sense, one step back and revisit the implications of the neoclassical frictionless model for the equilibrium rate of diffusion of a new technology. The application that we consider throughout is another famous case of 'slow' adoption: the farm tractor in American agriculture. 2 Following Lucas (1978), we study an industry model in which managers (farm 1 There are studies of speciÞc technologies that also support the idea of long lags. Greenwood (1997) reports that the 10-90 lag is 54 years for steam locomotives and 25 years for diesels, Rose and Joskow's (1990) evidence suggest a 10-90 lag of over 25 years for coal-Þred steam-electric high preasure (2400 psi) generating units, while Oster's (1982) data show that the 10-90 lag exceeds 20 years for basic oxygen furnaces in steel production. However, not all studies Þnd long lags; using Griliches (1957) estimates, the 10-90 lag ranges from 4 to 12 years for hybrid corn. 2 Using the fraction of farms that operate a tractor as our measure of diffusion, the 10-90 lag is at least 35 years in the case of tractors.
operators) differ in terms of their skills. We assume that the technology displays constant returns to scale in all factors, including managerial talent. In order to ignore frictions associated with indivisible inputs, we study the case in which there are perfect rental markets for all inputs. 3 Each farm operator maximizes proÞts choosing the mix of inputs. Given our market structure, this is a static problem. In addition, each manager has to make a discrete location choice: stay and continue farming, or migrate to an urban area and earn urban wages. We assume that migration is costly and, in fact, the cost of migration is the only non-convexity in our setting. The migration decision is dynamic. We take prices and the quality of all inputs as exogenous and we let the model determine the price of one input, land, so as to guarantee that demand equals the available stock.
Our model has three features that inßuence the diffusion rate: exogenous changes in the price of inputs other than the new technology, exogenous changes in the quality of the technology, and endogenous selection of Þrms (farm managers) out of the industry. We show that when these three factors are taken into account, the model is very successful at predicting the pattern of diffusion of tractors.
Our work emphasizes that farmers had a choice between a 'new' technology (tractors) and an 'old' technology (horses). However, a simple computation based on prices of tractors and horses cannot explain the observed pattern of diffusion. We study the impact on adoption of the dramatic decrease in horse prices and Þnd that it only had a marginal impact on tractor adoption. In the model labor is an input that must be combined with tractors and horses to produce 'traction services'. We Þnd that changes in wage rates play a critical role in explaining why the adoption of the tractor was delayed until the 1940s: Only at this time did real wages increase substantially, and this made the horse-technology less attractive.
In addition to the direct effect, the change in real wages has an indirect effect: it affects migration decisions. In equilibrium, wage increases induce marginal farm operators to leave the agricultural sector. Equilibrium migration is such that the distribution of skills of the remaining farmers improves over time, and this change also results in higher levels of adoption of tractors.
Finally, we estimate the change in the 'quality' of a tractor using standard hedonic techniques.
We Þnd that, even though the amount of 'tractor services' per tractor grew rapidly in the 1920s, the increase was not large enough to induce widespread adoption. Our estimates of tractor quality show a substantial increase in the post World War II period, and this coincides with the era of rapid adoption.
We choose the parameters of the model so that it reproduces several features of the U.S.
agricultural sector in 1910. We then use the calibrated model, driven by exogenous changes in prices, to predict the number the tractors (and other variables) for the entire 1910-1960 period.
The model is very successful at accounting for the diffusion of the tractor and the demise of the horse. The correlation coefficient between the model's predictions and the data is 0.99 for tractors and 0.98 for horses. We conclude that there is no tension between a frictionless neoclassical model and the rate at which tractors diffused in U.S. agriculture: the reason why diffusion was 'slow' is because it was not cost effective to use tractors more intensively.
In order to ascertain what are the essential features of the model that account for such a good Þt, we study several counterfactuals. We analyze versions of the model that keep wages, horse prices and tractor quality Þxed at their 1910 levels, and another version that ignores selection of Þrms (farmers) out of the industry. These alternative speciÞcations fail to match the data in several important dimensions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a brief historical account of the diffusion of the tractor and of the price and quality variables that are the driving forces in our model. Section 3 describes the model, and Section 4 discusses calibration. Sections 5 and 6 present our results, and section 7 offers some concluding comments.
Some History
This section presents some evidence the use of tractors and horses by U.S. farmers, on the behavior of wages and employment in the U.S. agricultural sector, and on the changes in the size distribution of farms.
Diffusion of the Tractor. The diffusion of the tractor was not unlike most other technologies, it had a characteristic S-shape. Figure 1 As the tractor made its way into the farms, the stock of horses began to decline. In 1920, there were more than 26 million horses and mules on farms. Thereafter, this stock began to decline and by 1960, there were just about 3 million. While the tractor was primarily responsible for this decline, it should be kept in mind that the automobile was also instrumental in the elimination of the horse technology. As in the case of other technologies, investment in horses -the 'dominated'
technology-was positive, even as the stock declined.
Real Prices for Tractors and Horses. Figure 2 plots the real price of a mid-size tractor and a pair of draft horses between 1910 and 1960. 4 Between 1910 and 1920, there is a sharp decline in the price of tractors which is partially reversed in the 1930s. In the 1940s and 1950s prices are lower and comparable to those prevailing in 1920s. One simple conclusion from this evidence is that farmers should have adopted tractors in 1920 at the same rate they did in the 1940s and 1950s. They did not. This observation lies behind the idea that adoption was slow. White (2000) collected data on some tractor characteristics and estimated a quality adjusted price for a tractor.
The resulting series -labeled Tractor-quality adjusted in Figure 2 -shows a steep decline until the mid-1920s, but very small changes after this. Thus, changes in the price of the technology -in the absence of frictions-appear to be insufficient to explain the pattern of adoption documented in Figure 1 . Land in mid-size farms (500-999 acres in size) also increased, though the increase was far less spectacular than its larger counterparts. As expected, land in smaller farms of size less than 500 acres decreased, with most of the decline after 1940.
Alternative Explanations. The standard approach to studying the diffusion of the tractor is based on the 'threshold' model originally introduced by David (1966) . In its simplest form, the 4 The data are from Olmstead and Rhode (2001) . We thank Paul Rhode for providing the data. More recently Olmstead and Rhode (2001) estimate that changes in the price of horses and in the size distribution delayed, to some extent, the adoption of tractors. In their model the size distribution is exogenous. White (2000) emphasizes the role of prices and quality of tractors. Using a hedonic regression, he computes a quality-adjusted price series for tractors. White conjectures that the increase in tractor quality should be taken into account to understand adoption decisions.
A Simple Model of Farming and Migration
Our approach is to model technology adoption using a standard proÞt maximization argument,
supplemented by a simple model of migration-choice along the lines of Becker (1964) and Sjaastad (1962) . We consider a setting in which farm operators are heterogeneous. Each individual has a level of 'farm organizational ability' or 'skill' denoted by e. The distribution of skills in the population of potential farmers is given, and denoted by µ. However, the distribution of skills among actual farmers is endogenously determined by the model. In each period, a farmer can either stay (and farm) or migrate to an urban area. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the migration decision is irreversible: once a farmer leaves the rural sector, he cannot return to farming. 5 If the farmer decides to stay, and operate the farm, he needs to decide how many tractors, horses, acres of land and labor to rent in spot markets. We consider the case in which there are perfect markets for all inputs. Thus, as is standard in the theory of the Þrm, indivisibilities at the individual farm level are irrelevant. 6 This implies that our model can be used to predict the total number of tractors but not their distribution across farms.
Each farmer maximizes the present discounted value of utility taking prices as given. If the individual is in the farm sector, he chooses, in every period, the quantity of tractor, horse, land and labor services in order to produce agricultural output. The one period proÞt of a farmer with 5 Given the relevant values of the cost of migration and the potential gains of reverse migration, we will argue later that this is not as extreme an assumption as it sounds. 6 Olmstead and Rhode (2001) provide evidence of the prevalence of contract work, i.e. of instances in which a farmer provides 'tractor services' to other farms.
managerial skill level e is given by,
where F (k t , h t , n t , a t , e) is a standard production function which we assume to be homogeneous of degree one in all inputs, including managerial skill, e, 7 k t is the demand for tractor services, h t is the demand for horse services (which we assume proportional to the stock of horses), n t = (n ht , n kt , n yt ) is a vector of labor services corresponding to three potential uses: operating horses, n ht , operating tractors, n kt , or other farms tasks, n yt , and a t is the demand for land services (which we assume proportional to acreage), andn t = n ht + n kt + n yt is the total demand for labor.
On the cost side, q ht + c ht is the full cost of operating a draft of horses. The term q ht is the rental price of a horse, and c ht includes operating costs (e.g. feed and veterinary services). The term q at + c at is the full cost of using one acre of land, and w F t is the cost of one unit of (farm) labor. Effective one period rental prices for horses and land (two durable goods) are given by
where δ jt are the relevant depreciation factors, and r t is the interest rate.
Since we view changes in the quality of tractors as a major factor driving the decision to adopt the technology, we speciÞed the model so that we could capture such variations. SpeciÞcally, we assume that tractor services can be provided by tractors of different vintages according to
wherek t (τ ) is the amount of tractor services provided by a tractor of vintage τ (i.e. built in period τ ) at time t, and m kt (τ ) is the number of tractors of vintage τ operated at time t. We assume that the amount of tractor services provided at time t by a tractor of vintage τ is given by,
where δ kτ is the depreciation rate of a vintage τ tractor, and v(x τ ) maps model-speciÞc characteristics, the vector x τ , into an overall index of tractor 'services' or 'quality.' Thus, our model assumes that the characteristics of a tractor are Þxed over its lifetime (i.e. no upgrades), and that tractors depreciate at a rate that is (possibly) vintage speciÞc. The rental price of a tractor is given by
where p kt (τ ) is the price at time t of a t − τ year old tractor, while the term c kt (τ ) captures the variable cost (fuel, repairs) associated with operating one tractor of vintage τ at time t.
The function π t (q t , c t , w F t , e) captures the payoff in period t to being a farmer. Instead of farming, an individual with skill level e can make an (irreversible) migration decision. If he chooses to migrate to an urban area at time t, he receives a payoff given by
where w U t+j is a measure of the utility associated with working in an urban area at time t + j, ϕ is the Þxed cost of migration, and
is the relevant discount factor.
It follows that the utility of an individual with skill e who starts period t in a rural area (i.e.
is a potential farmer) satisÞes the following Bellman equation
Given our assumption that F is increasing in e, it follows that V t (e) is also increasing in e.
Moreover, if a farmer with skill level e chooses not to migrate, then all farmers with skill level e 0 ≥ e will not migrate either. Put differently, equilibrium migration is fully described, for each t, by the level of skill of the marginal farmer, e * t . Our assumption that the migration decision is irreversible, implies that the equilibrium sequence {e * t } is non-decreasing.
Optimal choices of inputs and output by a farmer with skill level e are completely summarized by the Þrst order conditions of proÞt maximization. The resulting demand for input functions for, each e, are denoted by 8
where m ∈ {k, h, a,n} indicates the input type, q t is a vector of rental prices, and c t is a vector of operating costs, and w F t denotes real wages in the farm sector. Given that agricultural prices are largely set in world markets, and that domestic and total demand do not coincide, we impose as an equilibrium condition that the demand for land equal the available supply. Thus, land prices are endogenously determined.
Aggregate Implications
In this section we show how to compute the implications of our simple model for sector-wide aggregates. To this end we need to sum individual factor demands over all possible skill types.
The Number of Farms and Labor in Farms
Let the measure of potential farmers beN . We assume thatN = R ∞ 0 µ(de), for some measure µ. This measure captures the exogenous distribution of skills. let e * t be the 'marginal' farmer at time t; then, the number of farmers with ability levels less than or equal to e at time t is R e e * t µ(ds), for e ≥ e * t , and 0 for e < e * t . This distribution is time-varying and endogenously determined. The number of active farmers (and the number of farms) 9 at t is simply
Let,ê t be the value of e that satisÞes
Then, e * t evolves according to e * t = min
This formulation imposes the equilibrium condition that the the marginal farmer be indifferent between migrating or staying, or its identity 8 To be precise, the demand functions depend on current and future prices. Even though the pure demand decision is static due to our assumption of perfect rental markets, the migration decision implies that future prices inßuence current demand through their impact on the identity of the farmers who remain in the rural sector, i.e. the level of e. 9 Our model does not distinguish farms from farm operators.
is unchanged from the previous period. The condition V t (ê t ) = V U t is not a simple comparison. The reason is that V t (e) depends on all prices and, in our model, the price of land is determined endogenously (and a function of the distribution µ and the cutoff point e * t ). Hence, obtainingê t requires the computation of a Þxed point at each t.
If each farmer has an endowment ofn man/year equivalent (including family workers), the total number of man/year equivalent labor provided by farmers isnN ft , while the total number of man/year individuals hired is 10
The ratio of hired to total labor is given by
Tractors, Horses and Land
The aggregate demand for tractor services at time t, K t is given by
while the number of tractors purchased at t, m kt is
The law of motion for the stock of tractors (in units), K t , is 11
1 0 This formulation assumes that if a farmer's demand for labor, nt(qt, ct, w F t , e) falls short of his endowment,n, he can sell the difference in the agricultural labor market. This assumption is the natural analog of the perfect rental markets for tractors, horses, and land.
11 An alternative measure of the stock of tractors is given by Kt+1 = Kt + m kt+1 − m kt−T were T is the lifetime of a tractor of vintage t − T . This alternative formulation assumes that tractors are of the one-hose shay variety and that after T periods they are scrapped.
We assume that horse services are proportional to the stock of horses and, by choice of a constant, we set the proportionality ratio to one. Thus, the aggregate demand for horses is
We let the price of land adjust so that the demand for land predicted by the model equals the total supply of agricultural land denoted by A t . Thus, given wages, agricultural prices and horse and tractor prices, the price of land, p at , adjusts so that
Modeling Tractor Prices
From the point of view of an individual farmer the relevant price of tractor is q kt (τ ) : the price of tractor services corresponding to a t − τ year old tractor. Unfortunately, data on these prices are not available. However, given a model of tractor price formation, it is possible to determine rental prices for all vintages using standard, no-arbitrage, arguments.
As indicated above, we assume that a new tractor at time t offers tractor services given bỹ
, where v(x t ) is a function that maps the characteristics of a tractor into tractor services. We assume that, at time t, the price of a new tractor is given by
In this setting γ
ct is a measure of markup over the level of quality. If the industry is competitive, it is interpreted as the amount of aggregate consumption required to produce one unit of tractor services using the best available technology x t . 12 However, if there is imperfect competition, it is a mixture of the cost per unit of quality and a standard markup. For the purposes of understanding tractor adoption we need not distinguish between these two interpretations: any factor -technological change or variation in markups-that affects the cost of tractors will have an impact on the demand for them. In what follows we ignore this distinction, and we label γ ct as productivity in the tractor industry.
It is possible to show (see the Appendix) that no arbitrage arguments imply that
where
given that T is the lifetime of a tractor, and c kt is the cost of operating a tractor in period t.
This expression has a simple interpretation. The Þrst term,
, translates the price of a tractor into its ßow equivalent. If there were no changes in the unit cost of tractor quality, i.e. γ ct = γ ct+1 , this term is just that standard capital cost, (r t+1 + δ kt )/(1 + r t+1 ). The second term is the ßow equivalent of the present discounted value of the costs of operating a tractor from t to t + T − 1, C(t + 1, T − 1). In this case, the adjustment factor, 1 − ∆ t , includes more than just depreciation: total costs have to be corrected by the change in the 'quality' of tractors, which is captured by the ratio
To compute q kt (t) we need to separately identify v(x t ) and γ ct . 13 To this end we speciÞed that the price of a tractor of model m, produced by manufacturer k at time t, p mkt , is given by
is a vector of characteristics of a particular model produced at time t, the d t variables are time dummies, and E mt is a shock. This formulation is consistent with the Þndings of White (2000). 14 We used data on prices, tractor sales and a large number of characteristics for almost all models of tractors produced between 1919 and 1955 to estimate this equation. In the Appendix, we describe the data and the estimation procedure. Given our 1 3 It is clear that all that is needed is that we identify the changes in these quantities. 1 4 Formally, we are assuming that the shadow price of the vector of characteristics x t does not change over time. This is not essential, and the results reported by White (2000) , Table 10 estimates of the time dummy,d t , and the price of each tractor,p mkt , we computed our estimate of average quality,v(x t ) asv
with s mkt being the share of model m produced by manufacturer k in total sales at time t. The resulting time-series forv(x t ),γ ct andp kt are shown in Figure 3 . Even though the real price of a tractor does not show much of trend after 1920, its components do. Over the whole period our index of quality doubles, and our measure of productivity shows a substantial, but temporary increase in the 1940s, with a return to trend in the 1950s. In the 1920-1955 period γ ct more than doubles. Thus, during this period there were substantial increases in quality and decreases in costs; however, these two factors compensated each other, so that the real price of a tractor shows a modest decrease.
Steady States and Calibration
At the steady state all variables are constant. We denote the interest rate by R = (1 + r) −1 .
The steady state version of the demand for factors is m = m(q, c, w F , e) for m ∈ {k, h, a,n}. To compute steady state aggregates, we use the endogenous distribution of skills of farm operators, which is completely summarized by e * and µ.
Let the steady state proÞt ßow be denoted π(q, c, w F , e). Then, the no-migration condition in the steady state is π(q, c, w
Equilibrium in the land market requires that the appropriate version of (7) hold. Given this, it follows that average farm size ,ā, is given bȳ
Assuming that there is no change in tractor quality at the steady state, the number of tractors follows from the appropriate version of (4) and (5) it is given by
The model's prediction for the demand for hired labor, the ratio of hired to total labor and horses follow from the steady state versions of (1), (2), and (6). The model's prediction for total farm output, Y, is
where y(q, c, w F , e) is the value of output of a farm with managerial skill e at the prices corresponding to the steady state.
Model SpeciÞcation and Calibration
We consider the following speciÞcation of the farm production technology
This formulation captures the idea that farm output depends on services produced by tractors, z k , services produced by horses, z h , labor, n j , j = y, h, k, and managerial skills, e. We take a standard approach and use a Cobb-Douglas formulation except in two cases. We assume that the elasticity of substitution between tractors and labor in the production of tractor services is 1/(1 + ρ). Since we assume that the elasticity of substitution between horses and labor is one, this formulation allows us to capture potential differential effects of a change in the wage rate upon the choice between tractor and horses. Second, we also assume that basic tractor services, z k , and horse services, z h , are combined with elasticity of substitution 1/(1 + ρ) to produce power services, z.
We specify that exogenous technological evolves according to A ct = e γt . The technology is completely speciÞed by 9 parameters: (γ, A h , α c , α zy , α ny , α z , α k , α h , ρ).
We assume that the distribution µ is log-normal with meanμ and standard deviation σ. In addition to these two parameters, it is necessary to select values for the discount factor β, the cost of migration, ϕ, the man/year equivalent of a farm family,n. This is a total of 14 parameters.
We assume that β = 0.96, and thatn = 2. This last value is equivalent to specifying that the average farm family contributes labor equivalent to 2 workers. Since we could not Þnd reliable estimates of ϕ we considered initially a value of ϕ equal to one year of average earnings. 15 We performed some sensitivity analysis and varied ϕ between a half and one and a half of average yearly earnings, and our Þndings remain essentially unchanged.
We take the process {A ct } to correspond to total factor productivity. Even though there are estimates of the evolution of TFP for the agricultural sector, it is by no means obvious how to use them. The problem is that, conditional on the model, part of measured TFP changes is due to changes in the quality of tractors, v(x t ), as well as the rate of diffusion of tractors. Thus, in our model, conventionally measured TFP is endogenous. To compute (truly) exogenous TFP we used the following identiÞcation assumption: TFP is adjusted so that the model's prediction for the change in output between 1910 and 1960 match the data. This gives us an estimate of γ, which, in this case, is approximately 1.5% per year.
The remaining parameters of the model were picked to minimize the differences between model and data for the year 1910. We used two sets of moments from the 1910 agricultural sector to calibrate the model. The Þrst set of moments corresponds to input shares in agricultural output.
The second set of moments is related to properties of the size distribution of farms.
The moments corresponding to input shares are: 16 • Land share of output.
• Value of horses/output.
• Value of tractors/output.
• Labor share of output.
• Ratio of hired to total labor.
In all cases except land share, the model's predictions are complicated functions of the parameters. The theoretical counterparts of these moments (see the Appendix) are integrals of factor demand functions with respect to the endogenous distribution of farmer's skills.
Since heterogeneity of farmers plays such an important role in our story, we required the model to match as many moments of the distribution of the variable 'acres per farm' -our measure of
Þrm size-as we could Þnd. To ensure consistency over the 1910-1960 period we restricted ourselves to moments for which time series evidence is available in a consistent manner. The best information that we could obtain partitions the data into four bins. It includes information on the number of farms for establishments of 49 acres or less, 50-499 acres, 500-999 acres and 1,000 or more acres. We decided to merge the Þrst two categories, since we suspect that forces other than agricultural prices affect the number of very small farms (less than 49 acres). In addition to this information, we were able to Þnd some moments of the continuous size distribution. SpeciÞcally, we have information on average farm size conditional on being in a certain size category.
In order to match the average farm size in 1910,ā, we adjusted total land area (A in the model). Thus, we used a 'free' parameter to match this statistic. 17 Note, however, that total land area in 1960 is not a free parameter. We used data on Land in Farms (from the Historical Statistics) to estimate the supply of land in 1960 -using our units-as
A 60 = A 10 × measured change in land in farms.
We are then left with Þve moments:
• Average acres per farm, conditional on the farm being in the 500-999 acre category,ā 5−10 .
• Average acres per farm, conditional on the farm being in the 1,000 or more category,ā 10+ .
• Fraction of land in farms in the 500-999 acre category, s 5−10 .
• Fraction of land in farms in the 1,000 or more category, s 10+ . 18
• The coefficient of variation of 'acres per farm.'
The calibration proceeds as follows. We choose the parameters so that the model -evaluated at the 1910 prices-matches the 10 moments we obtained from the data. Since computing the model's predictions requires a Þxed point in the endogenously chosen 'marginal' farmer, e * , calibration is computationally intensive, and we were unable to match the data exactly. Table 1 spells out the parameters used to calibrate the model. Table 1 : Calibration
The Þrst two columns of Table 2 present the match between the model and U.S. data for our chosen speciÞcation for the year 1910. The match is fairly good in terms of most of the moments.
The one exception is the share of horses to output. Relative to the U.S. economy our speciÞcation underpredicts the horse output ratio. The values of the calibrated parameters seem reasonable and, when there is evidence available, fall in the range of estimates from micro studies. Of particular importance for our purposes is the elasticity of substitution between horse services and tractor services. This elasticity -given by 1/(1 + ρ)-is calibrated to be equal to 2.5. 19 The model also does pretty well in matching the size distribution of farms. 20 
Steady States Results
We use the model -driven by the exogenous price sequences-to predict the levels of a variety of variables in 1960. We then conduct a number of counterfactual experiments to illustrate the role played by each of our modeling assumptions.
Baseline Model
The predictions of the model for the level of input use in agriculture in 1960 are also presented in the last two columns of Table 2 . 20 The model produces a continuous distribution of farms (by farm size). We put the distribution in three bins (0-499, 500-999, and 1000+) to match the evidence on acreage. We use this distribution to compute the moments that we report. To compute mean conditional average acreage per farm we use (both for the model and the data) a richer continuous distribution.
though average farm size tripled, both model and data imply that the coefficient of variation of farm size is roughly constant.
As indicated before, we adjusted measured TFP growth so that the increase in total output predicted by the model and the data coincide in 1960. The required increase in TFP was 1.9. By way of comparison, the Historical Statistics reports that overall farm TFP grew by a factor of 2.3.
Thus, around 17.4% of the increase in farm TFP between 1910 and 1960 can be accounted for by the diffusion of the tractor, and the steady increase in average quality.
Sensitivity Analysis
As mentioned before, we view three features of the model as major determinants of the results: We view this result as evidence that modeling technology adoption ignoring the effects of changes in other input prices can lead to fairly erroneous conclusions.
The second experiment, reported in the column labeled v(x 1910 ), is designed to gauge the role of quality changes in the performance of the model. To this end, we Þxed tractor quality at its 1910 level for all periods. In this case, the model predicts that only half as many tractors would be adopted in 1960 relative to the data. A third experiment involved substituting the assumption of equilibrium migration, i.e. the equilibrium condition that migration is driven by a comparison between urban and rural net income, with the assumption that migration was random. Formally, we assume that the distribution of skills in 1960,μ, is now exogenously given bỹ
This speciÞcation 'scales down' the mass of farmers so as to match the decline in the total number of farms between 1910 and 1960, but it assumes that the distribution of skills is unchanged.
Ignoring selection results in an underprediction of tractor adoption of the order of 50%.
Finally, we use the model to study what role -if any-the dramatic change in horse prices
had on the predictions of the model. Somewhat surprisingly, holding horse prices at their 1910 levels the model still correctly predicts tractor adoption in 1960. As we will argue later, changes in horse prices do not have a large impact on the model's predictions and, hence, were not an important determinant of the speed of diffusion. However, it turns out that the existence of a 'horse technology' is essential since it gives a differential role to changes in real wages.
Thus, a tentative conclusion one draws from this exercise is that all the features that we included in the model, with the possible exception of horses, are quite important to produce a good match to the data. However, some caution needs to be exercised. Recall that in the baseline model we chose TFP -given its endogeneity-so as to match output. Thus, a much stronger 'test' of our baseline speciÞcation is to compare its predictions with those of the alternative models where, in each case, TFP is allowed to adjust as to match the growth in agricultural output. We now turn to those results.
Changing the Driving Processes: Adjusted TFP
In this section we describe the predictions of each of the four 'counterfactuals' when TFP is adjusted so that each model matches the observed growth in agricultural output between 1910
and 1960. Of course, given that, by construction, output levels are matched, each model has to be evaluated in terms of its ability to reproduce other moments.
Constant Wages As before, we set rural and urban wages at their 1910 levels and compute the predictions of the model for 1960. 22 The results are presented in the column labeled 'w 1910 '
in Table 4 The Importance of Quality-Adjustment Tractor quality increased throughout the period.
To quantify the contribution of quality changes to the results, we recomputed the model -with 22 TFP had to be adjusted by a factor of 1.18 to match the increase in output. Table 4 . Thus, to ascertain the ability of the model to match the data we need to consider moments that depend on the size distribution. Along these lines, the random migration model fails in two dimensions:
it underpredicts the coefficient of variation of 'acres per farm' by 25% (0.82 vs. 1.1), and it overpredicts the ratio of hired to total labor. More importantly, it gives counterfactual predictions for some moments of the distribution of farm size. We will discuss this in more detail in the analysis of the transitional dynamics.
The Role of Horse Prices Recent research on the topic of adoption of tractors has emphasized that adjustment of horse prices delayed the diffusion of tractors (see Olmstead and Rhode (2001)).
We can use our model to study how would the adoption decision have changed had horse prices not adjusted. The results are in the column 'p h1910 ' in Table 4 . It follows that horse prices did not had we ignored horse, we would have had only a minor impact from the change in wages, and this would have severely limited the model's ability to match the data. Explicitly modeling the choice of technology is important insofar as it provides a channel through which other, complementary, changes in prices affect the demand for tractors.
Changing the SpeciÞcation
In this section we present the result of modifying the speciÞcation of the production function from the one used in the baseline to a 'full' Cobb-Douglas functional form. We also explore the effect of (almost) eliminating the rents that accrue to farm operators. In all cases, we Þnd that the changes substantially worsen the model's ability to match the data.
Elasticity of Substitution Our speciÞcation of the technology is such that, at our preferred parameterization, the elasticity of substitution between tractors and labor is 2.5, while the elasticity of substitution between horses and labor is one. These differences in the elasticity of substitution result in variable shares and, more importantly, suggest that wage changes can have an asymmetric effect on the demand of horses and tractors. SpeciÞcally, we expect an increase in wages to induce substitution of tractors for horses.
In order to quantitatively assess the importance of this speciÞcation, we studied a version of the model in which ρ is set equal to 0. In this case, the production function is Cobb-Douglas in all its variables. As before, we adjusted TFP growth so that the model exactly matches the observed growth in output. TFP was increased by a factor of 1.72. The results for the 1960-1910 ratios and levels in 1960 of some important variables are in the column labeled 'ρ = 0' in Table 5 .
It follows that the Cobb-Douglas speciÞcation severely underpredicts the diffusion of the tractor.
The reason for this result is simple: The Cobb-Douglas functional form implies constant input shares. In the absence of spectacular price decreases in the own price -and tractor prices showed a large, but not spectacular decrease over this period -the model predicts modest increases in the quantities demanded.
Changes in the Share of Managerial Skills The assumption that managerial skills receive a non-zero fraction of total revenue plays a signiÞcant role in our model, as it has an impact on migration decisions. We considered a speciÞcation that signiÞcantly reduces the share of proÞts that accrue to skill. The results are in the column labeled 'α c = 0.999' in Table 5 .
The model underpredicts the number of tractors by 13% and, more importantly, predicts a huge increase in average farm size. While in the data, the average acreage per farm increases by a factor of 2.13, this speciÞcation predicts an increase four times as large. Of course, this is a direct consequence of the higher elasticity of migration with respect to wages induced by the small share of proÞts received by farm operators. The results for 1960 indicate that the model does a reasonable job of matching some of the key features of the data. However, they are silent about the model's ability to account for the speed at which the tractor was adopted.
Was diffusion too slow? To answer this question, the entire dynamic path from 1910 to 1960 needs to be computed. To do this, we took the observed path for prices (p k , p h , p c , w, w F ), operating costs (c k , c h , c a ) and depreciation rates (δ k , δ h , δ a ), and used them as inputs to compute the predictions of the model for the 1910-1960 period. 24 At the same time, we adjusted the time path of TFP so that the model matches the data in terms of the time path of agricultural output, the analog of our steady state procedure. This helps to get the scale right along the entire transition. This exercise is computationally very intensive as it requires solving for the Þxed point in the sequence of TFPs from 1910 to 1960, in addition to calculating the equilibrium in the land 24 We use Þve-year moving averages for all these sequences. For the years 1910 and 1960, we use actual data (remember that these dates are viewed as steady-states). For all other years, the Þve year average was constructed as the average of the the year in question, the two years before and the two years. In a sense, using a Þve year average substitutes for the lack of adjustment costs in the model. The predictions of the model (and the relevant data for the U.S.) for the number of tractors and horses is depicted in Figure 4 . The model does a remarkable job of tracking the actual diffusion of the tractor and the decline of the horse.
To provide a quantitative dimension of goodness of Þt, we deÞne a distance between model and data, φ, given by
and x is a vector of predictions, while y is a vector (of equal length) that includes observed (U.S.)
values. The sample mean of this vector is denotedȳ. Thus, φ is reminiscent of an R 2 , and it seems a natural measure of 'goodness of Þt' for models that aim to match transition data. Note that if the model is no better at predicting the data than the sample mean, φ = 0, while if the model Þts the data perfectly φ = 1. We computed the measure φ for tractors, horses and employment. The results are in Table 6 Series 
Conclusions
The frictionless neoclassical framework has been used to study a wide variety of phenomena including growth and development. However, the perception that the observed rate at which many new technologies have been adopted is too slow to be consistent with the model, has led to 26 As shown in the appendix the (continuous) version of the coefficient of risk aversion corresponding to the random migration model is constant over time. Thus, the decreasing trend is driven by the 'discretization' of the variable in our three size categories. Note, however, that this is also how the coefficient of variation corresponding to the U.S.
is computed. In this paper we argue that a careful modeling of the shocks faced by an industry suggests that the neoclassical model can be consistent with 'slow' adoption. 27 Since most models with 'frictions' are such that the equilibrium is not optimal, the choice between standard convex models and the various alternatives has important policy implications. It is clearly an open question how far 27 More generally, our model suggests that to understand the adoption of a technology in a given sector it may be critical to model developments in another sector. To see this, consider, as in this paper, two technologies that use a given input in different quantities. In this setting shocks to another sector that uses the same input will induce price changes which, in turn, will affect technology choices. Thus, general equilibrium effects can induce slow adoption.
our results can be generalized. However, at the very least, they cast a doubt on the necessity of 'frictions' in accounting for the rate of diffusion of new technologies.
Appendix

Data Sources
This section details the available data, the sources which they were obtained and what they were used for. The data were used to calibrate the model and to compare the model and the data.
Income and Output
Farm Output: HS Series K 414 -used to compute the endogenous TFP in getting the model to match the data in terms of its predictions for output.
Value of Gross Farm Output: HS Series K 220-239 -used to compute factor shares.
Land
Number of farms: HS Series K4 -used to compute average size of farm 
Derivation of the User Cost of a Tractor
From
and given that a vintage-τ tractor at time t provides tractor services equal tok t (τ ) ≡ v(x τ )(1 − δ kτ ) t−τ , the rental price of such a tractor at time t is
This simply says that a t − τ year old tractor at time t will be a t − τ + 1 year old tractor at t + 1. This formula has the drawback that it depends on the price of used tractors. Since there are no data available on used tractor prices we now proceed to derive an expression for q kt (τ ) using simple arbitrage arguments. As shown in the text, the optimal choice of m kt (τ ) requires that
Iterating forward and denoting by T (τ, t) the number of periods of useful life that a t − τ old tractor has left, we get that
where R t (j) is as deÞned in the previous section. Using the special structure of k t (τ ) it follows that
To simplify the presentation we assume that two consecutive vintages of tractors have the same depreciation (δ kt ) and economic lifetime (T ). Moreover, we assume that operating costs vary over time, but are not a function of the vintage, i.e. c kt+j (τ ) = c kt+j , for all τ . In this case, using the previous formula for τ = t (one period old tractors) and τ = t + 1 (new tractors) it follows that
However, the last term in square brackets must be zero, since a tractor of vintage t + 1 is optimally scrapped when the marginal product of its remaining tractor services, p ct+1+T F k (t + 1 + T )v(x t+1 )(1 − δ kt ) T , equals the marginal cost of operating it, c kt+1+T .
Let the present discounted value of the cost of operating a tractor for T − 1 periods starting at t + 1 be given by
and the 'effective' depreciation of a vintage t tractor between t and t+1 be
which is expression (8) in the text.
This formula illustrates the forces at work in determining the rental price of a tractor:
• Increases in the price of a new tractor, p kt (t), increase the cost of operating it. This is the (standard) price effect.
• Periods of anticipated productivity increases -low values of
-result in increases in the rental price of tractors. This effect is the complete markets analog of the option value of waiting: buyers of a tractor at t know that, due to decreases in the price of new tractors in the future, the value of their used unit will be lower. In order to get compensated for this, they require a higher rental price.
• The term (1 − ∆ t+1 )C(t + 1, T − 1) captures the increase in cost per unit of tractor services associated with operating a one year old tractor, relative to a new tractor.
Estimation of Tractor Prices
In order to compute the user cost of tractor services, we need to estimate the effect that different factors have upon tractor prices. Our basic speciÞcation is
where p mkt is the price of a model m tractor produced by manufacturer m at time t, the vector
is a vector of characteristics of a particular model produced at time t, the d t variables are time dummies, and E mt is a shock that we take to be independent of the x m jt variables and independent across models and years. We In addition, we included 15 manufacturer dummies and 35 time dummies. We selected the variables we used from a larger set, from which we eliminated one of a pair whenever the simple correlation coefficient between two variables exceeded 0.80. We experimented using a smaller set of variables as in White (2000) , but our estimates of the time dummies were practically identical.
Our data covers the period 1920-1955. However, the period we are interested in studying is is due to increases in productivity (more than 80%). This is consistent with the accounts that important changes in the tractor technology did not occurred until the 1920s.
Calibration
1. Input moments. The mapping between observed input ratios and shares and the corresponding objects in the model is given by and their analogues in the model are:
= horses/output ratio,
= tractors/output ratio,
= hired/total labor 2. Size Distribution. Letẽ k be the skill level of a farmer who operates a farm of size k × 10 2 .
Thus,ẽ k solves a(q, c, w
Then the average acreage of a farm, conditional on being in, say, the 500-999 acre category .
Finally, we also matched the second moment of the distribution. For simplicity -and given that the mean is matched by assumption-we chose to match the coefficient of variation. Thus, the model also matches [ R ∞ e * [a(q, c, w F , e) −ā] 2 µ(de)] 1/2 R ∞ e * a(q, c, w F , e)µ(de) = C.V. of F arm Land.
Random vs. Selective Migration
In this section we study a version of the model with random, as opposed to equilibrium, migration. We show that in terms of aggregates like horses, tractors and labor, the two models are observationally equivalent. We also show that they have different predictions for the ratio of hired to total labor.
Let each farmer's production function be given by y(e, k, a) = BF (e, k, a),
where F is assumed homogeneous of degree one in all three inputs. We interpret k as tractors, a as land, and e as managerial skill.
The farmer's Þrst order proÞt maximization conditions are
where κ ≡ k/e, and α ≡ a/e are tractors and land per unit of managerial skill. The system (??) determines a pair of input demand functions given by, κ =κ(p k , p a , B), α =ᾱ(p k , p a , B).
These functions are homogeneous of degree 0 in all three arguments.
We assume that there is an initial steady state characterized by a given distribution of skills.
To be precise, let's denote the marginal farmer in the initial steady state by e * 0 . The total number of farmers is just N f,0 =N − µ(e * 0 ). The problem. Suppose that due to 'some' additional constraint, the identity of the marginal farmer changes to e * S . Suppose that the baseline model is successful in matching both the supply of land, A, and a given (but arbitrary) level of output, Y, for some (endogenously determined) price of land, p S a , and TFP level, B S . Then, we want to claim that there exists a value of B, which we will denote, B R , and a price of land, p R a , such that another economy with e * R = e * 0 , and the number of farmers suitably 'scaled down,' is consistent with exactly the same pair (A, Y).
Moreover, the total demand for tractors are also equal, that is Y S = Y R .
Derivation. It follows from the deÞnition that a(e) = αe, and hence, for the selection model,
To ease notation, let's deÞne the average quality of a manager as
edµ(e) N − µ(e * i )
.
It then follows that
Since the distribution of skills under random migration is given by, µ R (e) =N − µ(e * S ) N − µ(e * 0 )
µ(e), the analog of (12) is,
whereē 0 is the average quality of a manager in the original steady state. It follows from (13) and (14) that if the random migration model will succeed, then,
Since the demand for tractors by a manger with index e is k(e) = κ α a(e), then the prediction of model i for the aggregate stock of tractors is
It follows that K S = K R if and only if the ratios 
Total output predicted by model i is
Imposing (16) and that the output level be the same across models we obtain
Thus, to illustrate the conditions under which both models are identical, let's take (17) as the deÞnition of B R , and let (16a) deÞne p R a . Thus, for the given pair (p R a , B R ) it is necessary to check that (16b) is satisÞed. This last condition (recall that the price p k is common to both models) is equivalent to, 
It is clear that, in general, (18) will not be satisÞed and, hence, that the two versions of the model are not observationally equivalent. However, in the Cobb-Douglas case (18) holds and the models are observationally equivalent. More precisely, assume that y(e, k, a) = Be θ G(k, a) 1−θ , 0 < θ < 1.
In this case, (18) is
In the Cobb-Douglas case (17) implies
This condition shows the sense in which changes in the average quality of the managers is equivalent to changes in the level of TFP. .
Thus, for the random migration model, e * R,t = e * 0 and, hence, the coefficient of variation is constant over time. On the other hand, for the selective migration model, e * S,t increases over time and, in general, this results in a variable σ a,S a . Finally, consider the implication of the two models for the ratio of hired to total workers. Let's assume that both models yield the same prediction about the aggregate number of hours. Let ξ i be the demand for labor per unit of farm skill e. If total demand for labor coincide, it must be the case that where ξ S ù e S =n. Sinceē S >ē R the random migration model overpredicts the fraction of farms with hired workers.
Counterfactuals: Detailed Results
In this section we present the unadjusted tables corresponding the counterfactuals in the text.
